Hate in Context
Week 8: Community Impacts of Hate Crime · LENS preview
Between 2011 and 2016, about 30,000 foreign fighters traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State (Benmelech and Klor 2018). Many from Western countries.
Radicalisation as a process
- A gradual personal and political transformation
- A “catalyst event” can accelerate it ≈ Wiktorowicz’s (2005) cognitive opening: a shock/crisis that unsettles prior beliefs and makes new worldviews more receptive
- Catalysts can be economic (job loss, blocked mobility), social (alienation, discrimination), political (war, conflict), or personal (death of a loved one)
Muro (2016), Fig. 1
Borum: four-stage mindset
Borum (2003; 2011): how grievances and vulnerabilities turn into hatred and justification for violence (“terrorist mindset”).
- Grievance (“It’s not right”): an unsatisfying event/condition is identified
- Injustice (“It’s not fair”): that condition is framed as unjust
- Target attribution (“It’s your fault”): blame is assigned to a broad group (e.g., the West)
- Demonisation (“You’re evil”): the responsible party is vilified → indiscriminate aggression becomes easier to justify
Muro (2016), Fig. 2
Moghaddam: staircase to terrorism
Moghaddam (2005): radicalisation as a staircase, i.e., everyone starts on the ground floor, each floor is narrower (fewer people ascend) and almost none reach the top.
- Ground: discontent and perceived injustice/deprivation
- 1st floor: some try to do something (seek options/solutions)
- 2nd floor: if no solution → displace aggression onto enemy
- 3rd floor: moral engagement with group legitimising the cause
- 4th floor: recruitment into a terrorist organisation
- 5th floor: trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms → violence/terrorist act
Muro (2016), Fig. 3 — built around suicide bombing; stages may not generalise everywhere
McCauley & Moskalenko: Pyramid model
McCauley & Moskalenko (2008): Radicalisation = the gradient from a broad base of sympathisers to a tiny terrorist apex (higher on the pyramid → more commitment/fewer people).
- Sympathisers (base): agree with the goals terrorists claim to fight for and identify with the community they claim to represent but not violent means
- Supporters: justify the goals and the violent means
- Activists: do not commit the violence themselves but may provide support (recruitment, political/financial aid,…)
- Radicals: few active terrorists/fighters (indiscriminate violence against civilians)
Muro (2016), Fig. 4
Findings
Higher local far-right vote share is associated more online radicalisation across several radicalization measures.
Hate crimes and ISIS support (UK)
In the UK, more hate crime are associated with more pro-ISIS tweeting (A). The link between far-right vote-shares and pro-ISIS tweets is also stronger where hate crime is higher (B)
Event responses by far-right climate
After terrorist attacks, ISIS propaganda, and PEGIDA marches, pro-ISIS rhetoric rises more where far-right vote share is higher
A threshold for hostile climate?
[discussed in class]
A common elite/media frame
Jihadi radicalisation often framed as an “imported” problem by (far right) political elites:
Georg Pazderski (AfD)
“Not all refugees are terrorists, but most terrorists nowadays are refugees.” (2016)
Marine Le Pen (FN)
“Multiculturalism is the soft weapon of Islamic fundamentalists…” (2017)
Charles Michel (Belgian PM)
“Almost every time, there is a link to Molenbeek.” (2015)
The Guardian (Nov 2015)
Asylum seekers (FR/DE)
Asylum-seeker share is negatively related to pro-ISIS indicators, while far-right vote share stays positive
Muslim share and foreigners (UK)
UK: % Muslim negatively correlated with pro-ISIS content; % foreigners is weak; far-right vote share remains positive and robust
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